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Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions:   






February 2011 (revised May 2011) 
ABSTRACT 
Competition among producers within an integrated electricity system is impeded by any 
limited transmission capacity there may be at its borders. Two alternative market mechanisms 
have recently been designed to organize the allocation of scarce transmission capacity at 
cross-border level: (i) the “implicit auction”, already used in some countries, and (ii) the 
“coordinated explicit auction”, proposed by the European Transmission System Operators 
(ETSO) but not implemented yet. The main advantage of the explicit auction is that it allows 
each country to keep its own power exchange running. In the European institutional context, 
this is seen as a factor of success of a market reform, although the explicit auction (not 
coordinated) is known to be less efficient than the implicit mechanism. The addition of a 
coordination dimension in the explicit auction is intended to solve problems of international 
flows. We use an experimental methodology to identify and compare in a laboratory setting 
the efficiency properties of these two market mechanisms, given a market structure similar to 
the existing one in continental Europe, i.e. a competitive oligopoly. Our main result highlights 
the  inefficiency  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  compared  to  the  performance  of  the 
implicit  auction,  measured  in  terms  of  both  energy  prices  and  transmission  capacity 
allocation. We suggest that the poor performance of the coordinated explicit auction in the 
laboratory is due to the level of individual expectations about both energy and transmission 
prices  that  the  mechanism  demands.  One  solution  to  resolve  this  problem  when  the 
mechanism  is  implemented  in  the  field  would  be  to  design  an  additional  and  secondary 
market for “used” transmission capacity. 
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1  2 
Coordinating cross-border congestion management through auctions:   
An experimental approach to European solutions 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The  Internal  Electricity  Market  (IEM)  targeted  by  the  1996  Directive  96/92/EC  is 
currently still far from completion, for Europe is still fragmented into a number of regions, 
each with its own transactional arrangement and organized marketplace for wholesale electric 
power. However, the recent coupling and mergers of power exchanges – as for example the 
German EEX Power Spot and the French Powernext Day-Ahead within EPEX Spot in 2009, 
the  trilateral  coupling  of  the  EPEX  Day-Ahead  with  the  Day-Ahead  markets  of  the 
Netherlands  and  Belgium,  or  the  Swiss-German  Eurex  and  Slovenian  Borzen  in  2008  – 
together with the political pressures from the Commission (European  Commission, 2009) to 
organize the IEM, can be considered as efforts towards a more effective integration.  
The creation of the IEM depends heavily on efficient coordination between national 
markets. One condition to ensure efficient coordination is to make sure that, as far as possible, 
electricity flows between Member States as easily as it currently flows within them (European 
Commission,  2004).  This  requires  sufficient  interconnections  and  adequate  and  efficient 
cross-borders congestion management schemes. At present, the main obstacle to integration is 
precisely  the  scarcity  of  cross-border  transmission  capacity  across  Europe.  This  situation 
leads to cross-border congestions and their related externalities: uncertainty, risk and market 
power  problems.  To  mitigate  these  problems,  the  EU  supports  measures  to  increase 
transmission capacity while at the same time looking for efficient cross-border congestion 
management methods. In this paper we focus on the second issue, and examine market design 
mechanisms proposed to improve the management of cross-border congestion.  
In the June 2003 regulation (EC) n°1228/2003 of the European Parliament and the 
Council  on  the  “Conditions  for  access  to  the  network  for  cross-border  exchanges  in 
electricity”,  the  Commission  laid  down  preliminary  guidelines  for  the  implementation  of 
cross-border  congestion  management  methods.  The  guidelines  stipulate  that  these 
management methods should include “non-discriminatory market-based solutions that give 
efficient  economic  signals”  (European  Commission,  2003).  To  conform  to  the  European 
regulation, the administrative methods traditionally used in Europe and based on pro-rata or 








































1  3 
replaced by market-based methods for day-ahead allocation in July 2004
1. These are flow-
based zonal methods
2 which can rely on two types of auction mechanism: the implicit auction 
and the explicit auction
3.   
The first auction mechanism is called “implicit” as the available transmission capacities 
are implicitly taken into account by the market operator in the selection of energy offers. It is 
a pricing mechanism derived from the early work on nodal pricing by Bohn, Caramanis and 
Schweppe (1984) and Hogan (1992). The implicit auction is currently applied in Europe to 
allocate transmission capacity among the Nordic countries
4 (known as the “market splitting” 
method
5), in the trilateral coupling of the Netherlands, Belgium and France (TLC), in the 
MIBEL market covering the Iberian Peninsula, and within the Italian market which is splitted 
into  several  internal  zones.  It  already  reflects  a  certain  degree  of  integration,  and  is 
particularly appropriate for day-ahead capacity rights, since the flow is based on the day-
ahead market data from two interconnected markets. However the main argument against this 
method in the European context is that the meshing of the continental grid makes market 
splitting,  as  well  as  other  related  methods,  inapplicable  without  the  merger  of  power 
exchanges, which is quite unrealistic from an institutional and political point of view. As 
Ehrenmann  and  Smeers  (2005)  explain,  the  existing  differences  in  the  architecture  of 
electricity markets in European neighbouring countries (including pool structure as well as 
bilateral  markets  now  in  place  and  the  wide  diversity  of  market  rules)  render  integration 
currently difficult if not impossible. Hence, the existence of various system operators, each 
responsible for one control area, politically and institutionally constrains the generalization of 
the  implementation  of  the  implicit  auction.  Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  that  there  are  also 
technical  obstacles,  but  these  are  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  The  only  feasible  and 
plausible solution in the short term is thus to link zonal markets, but that is not conducive to 
integration and the creation of the IEM. 
In the second auction mechanism, called the explicit auction mechanism, transmission 
capacities are auctioned separately and before the allocation of wholesale energy. Explicit 
                                                 
1  For  an  overview  of  the  current  cross-border  congestion  management  methods  in  Europe,  cf. 
ETSO (2006). 
2  Flow-based  methods  use  the  so-called  power  transfer  distribution  factors  (PTDF)  to  convert  the 
commercial exchanges into their physical influence on the cross-border flow. Another aspect of these methods, 
which cannot be considered within the scope of this paper, is that they convert bottlenecks or border capacities 
into physical limitations of those flows. 
3 For a review of congestion management methods, see De Vries (2004). 
4 Denmark (west and east), Finland, Sweden and Norway. 
5 The market-splitting approach assumes an existing integrated market where injections and withdrawals 








































1  4 
auctions  are  increasingly  used  among  European  countries  (ETSO,  2006).  They  are 
particularly  appropriate  for  the  allocation  of  long-term  capacity  rights  (sold  at  yearly  or 
monthly auctions). In practical terms, they do not require a single power exchange as in the 
case of the implicit auction. However, as in California, it is up to the system operator to 
coordinate the physics of the problem after transmission and generation contracts have been 
signed ex ante by all the private scheduling coordinators. This coordination problem between 
system operators is typically not taken into account in the explicit auction mechanism, and 
therefore does not favour market integration. The so-called “explicit coordinated auction” 
mechanism has been proposed by European system operators precisely to offset this lack of 
coordination in the case of cross-border flows. 
  The spirit of the “coordinated explicit auction” mechanism was initially proposed by 
the  Florence  Regulatory  Forum  established  in  1999.  It  was  seen  as  a  way  to  overcome 
political and institutional obstacles to coordination and integration of European markets. This 
mechanism  was  subsequently  adopted  by  the  European  Transmission  System  Operators 
(ETSO) in 2001. In the ETSO’s proposal, the auction is coordinated, in the sense that, instead 
of having an auction for transmission capacity at each cross-border zone (with the various 
system operators in charge of coordinating the physics), the transmission capacities are all 
auctioned  off  in  the  same  process  (especially  across  zones  characterized  by  strong  loop 
flows).  In  other  words,  the  available  transmission  capacities  are  all  covered  by  a  single 
auction. At the individual level, this centralized mechanism should limit uncertainties over the 
allocation  and  prices  of  transmission  rights,  and  therefore  reduce  the  risk  of  productive 
inefficiencies. At the aggregate level, a better coordination between zones should enable a 
better allocation of transmission capacity (and a better estimation of capacities that could be 
auctioned in a secure and reliable way). Overall, the aim of this proposal is to achieve the full 
potential of the existing European interconnected network, through an adequate cross-border 
congestion  management  scheme,  while  each  area  may  keep  its  own  rules  to  manage  its 
internal problems. In a nutshell, this solution seems to be more “institutionally friendly”.  
Since  the  ETSO’s  proposal,  the  efficiency  conditions  of  the  implementation  of  the 
coordinated auction mechanism in Europe has been studied. However, it has not yet achieved 
political  or  scientific  consensus,  and d iscussions  are  still  on-going  regarding  both  its 
efficiency  in  managing  cross-border  congestions  and  its  properties  in  terms  of  European 








































1  5 
recommends use of the coordinated mechanism notably for long- and medium-term allocation 
(EU, 2009)
6. Our contribution seeks to participate in the on-going debate on cross-border 
management solutions and to further investigate the efficiency of the coordinated auction 
mechanism.  
From a theoretical point of view, under the assumption of benevolent generators that 
truthfully  reveal  their  marginal  costs,  it  is  demonstrated  that  both  mechanisms  –  the 
coordinated  explicit  auction  and  the  implicit  auction  –  should  lead  to:  (i)  an  efficient 
allocation of available transmission capacity, and (ii) an efficient production in which the 
least-cost generation units are successively required to produce, given the capacity constraints 
of the network. However, as Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2005) point out, this analysis is based on 
perfect  and  rational  individual  expectations,  which  is  a  strong  behavioural  hypothesis. 
Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) emphasize how the perfect anticipation assumption strongly 
constrains the model, while the aggregation of the network limits the results (to keep traders 
from investigating the intricacies of the electrical network).  
From an empirical point of view, the international experiences of a separation of the 
energy and transmission markets underlying coordinated auction have raised some doubts 
about its efficiency (Ehrenmann, Smeers 2005), while the coordinated explicit auction – as 
proposed by ETSO – has never been applied. Consequently, there is a lack of data to be able 
to assess its efficiency.  
In this article we use the experimental methodology to collect data enabling us to assess 
whether and how the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction mechanism succeed 
in efficiently allocating scarce transmission capacity, while reducing generators' ability to 
exercise market power. Part of our contribution is methodological: in the laboratory setting 
we recreate a reasonable level of complexity enabling us to analyze in depth the two market 
mechanisms  currently  used  or  under  scrutiny  in  Europe.  We  construct  an  experimental 
environment,  using  smart  computer-assisted  markets  with  a  three-node  network  and  its 
consequential constraints like loop flows and congestions, including the stochastic nature of 
the loads on the lines, the associated need to respect the physical constraints in the network, 
and the location variability of transmission losses. Our experimental design reproduces an 
industry  structure  akin  to  the  current  one  in  Continental  Europe:  a  competitive  oligopoly 
                                                 
6 For example, the next step has been the ETSO-EuroPex’s proposal (ETSO-EuroPex 2004) which is 
conceived  as  the  merging  of  ETSO  and  the  EuroPex  proposals.  The  European  Commission  subsequently 
recommended  use  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  for  the  allocation  of  long-term  capacities  (annually, 
monthly, weekly), and the implicit auction through flow-based market coupling for the allocation of day ahead 








































1  6 
where major players are emerging, each of which is relying on a geographical stronghold and 
is present both at the production and at the supply level. Actually, in Europe there are neither 
“pure”  generators  nor  “pure”  suppliers  in  the  electricity  industry.
7  We  reproduce  these 
individual characteristics in our experimental design by endowing “generators/suppliers” with 
both supply and demand functions which implicitly define individual net positions in each 
market as net buyer or net seller.  
We examine the effects of the two auction mechanisms – the implicit auction and the 
coordinated auction – on the pattern of both energy prices and capacity prices, and on the 
transit volume. Our main result highlights the superiority of the implicit auction mechanism 
over the coordinated explicit auctions. The coordinated explicit auction is inefficient in terms 
of global efficiency, and in terms of allocation of transmission capacity. Energy prices are 
highly  volatile  in  the  coordinated  auction  treatment  and  the  transmission  capacities  are 
inefficiently used.  
The paper is organized as follow. In Section 2, we present the experimental design and 
procedure, i.e. the characteristics of the electric power network (nodes, transmission capacity 
and power flows), the characteristics of the market participants (portfolio of generation units, 
individual supply and demand functions, and localization in the network), and the market 
institutions  (the  implicit  auction  and  the  coordinated  explicit  auction).  In  Section  3,  we 
present our results on the global efficiency of the two auction mechanisms, the patterns of 
market  prices  for  transmission  capacity  and  energy,  and  the  management  of  congestions. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Our  experimental  design  seeks  to  represent  the  main  features  of  the  continental 
european  market,  in  a  laboratory  setting.  In  terms  of  market  structure,  the  experiment 
reproduces the same magnitude of market shares of continental european generators, and their 
localization in the network, which together characterize potential market power. The network 
configuration reproduces the existence of capacity limitations, but we do not take the intra-
country situations into account (in particular, we do not consider internal congestions). We 
first present the electric power network, and then turn to the description of the two market 
mechanisms.  
                                                 








































1  7 
2.1.  The network  
The network is modelled in the experiments as a three-node network with loop flows. In 
our  model,  a  node  refers  to  a  country.  The  three  nodes  are  called  A,  B  and  C.  The 
transmission lines between nodes are defined by: (i) their maximum capacities – 50 units of 
energy between A and B, 30 between A and C, and 30 between B and C –; and (ii) the power 
flows in the network, given the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDF) matrix. These 
PTDF  give  the  flows  through  the  lines  A-B,  A-C  and  C-B  respectively,  resulting  from 
injections at all nodes of the network and withdrawals at node C (taken here as the “hub”). 
Figure 1 represents our experimental network. 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Three-node experimental network with loop flow effects (injection at node A and withdrawal at node C).  
 
 
Table 1 - PTDF matrix for a withdrawal 
of one unit of energy at node C.  
 
 
  Interconnection 
Node of injection 
 
A B  A C  B C 
A  +1/3  +2/3  +1/3 
B  -1/3  +1/3  +2/3 
Maximum capacity  50  30  30 
 
The market structure in the experiments consists of 4 generators (G1 through G4 in 
Figure  1),  unevenly  located  in  the  network.  Generator  G1  is  dominant  at  node  A,  while 
generator G4 is dominant at node C, and generators G2 and G3 are together dominant at node 
B. At each node, a generator is endowed with an individual supply function and an individual 
demand  function.  These  demand  and  supply  functions  are  designed  in  order  to  model 
individual willingness to buy or to sell energy in the three different markets. The inverse 








































1  8 
Symmetrically, the inverse supply function gives the limit price above which the generator is 
willing to sell energy. Limit prices reflect the opportunity cost for using production facilities 
and the commitment to a must-serve demand. For instance, a generator with a must-serve 
demand constraint is a potential buyer in the market at any price below its own production 
cost. Symmetrically, a generator with an excess of production capacity is a potential seller at 
any  price  above  its  production  cost.  Demand  and  supply  functions  are  reproduced  in  the 
experiment according to the redemption-value theory principle (Smith, 1976). Accordingly, a 
generator in the laboratory is informed about the value (redemption value) it receives for each 
unit it buys and the value (marginal cost) it supports for each unit it sells. Table 2 reproduces 
as an example the redemption values and marginal costs of Generator 1 at node B. 
 
Table 2 - Individual demand and supply of Generator 1 at node B for base load period (values are given in ECU, 
an experimental currency) 
Individual supply function    Individual demand function 
Marginal Cost (MC)    Redemption value (RV) 
From unit: …  To unit ….  UC    From unit: …  To unit ….  RV 
0  30  80    0  70  79 
31  80  130    71  170  0 
81  180  200         
 
 
The market demand and supply for energy at each node is the aggregation of individual 
demand and supply functions. The market demand is cyclic, from both an individual and an 
aggregate  point  of  view  with  two  levels,  namely  the  peak-load  and  base-load  levels
8. 
Aggregate demand and supply at each node for, respectively, peak-load and base-load levels 
are described in Figures 2 and 3.  
 
 
                                                 
8 This specification aims at reproducing in a simple way two characteristics of electricity demand: variability 
and cyclic variation. It is a simplification of the typical daily load curve that exists in reality with two higher-
level periods (between 7.00 and 9.00a.m. and 5.00 and 7.00p.m.) and two lower-level periods (between 3.00 and 








































1  9 
 
Fig. 2 - Supply and demand curves for base-load periods at each node 
 
 
Fig. 3 - Supply and demand curves for peak-load periods at each node 
 
The optimal flows in the network and the competitive equilibrium market prices in these 
two situations are described in Figure 4 below. These equilibrium prices are computed under 













































1  10 
For  base-load  and  peak-load  periods,  we  compute  the  maximum  global  surplus  by 
summing the four generators’ profits plus the congestion rent at the equilibrium. The value of 
the maximum global surplus is 5,170 ECU for base-load periods and 2,830 for peak-load 
periods
9.   
Finally, the information released to all participants during the course of the experiment 
concerns the basic characteristics of the network, that is, the PTDF-matrix and the maximum 
capacity of each line (both held constant across sessions), the market prices at each node, as 
well as the flows on each line as an historical informational feedback. 
2.2.  The market institutions  
In  the  following  subsections  we  present  the  two  alternative  market  institutions, 
namely, the implicit auction and the coordinated explicit auction, as we modelled them in the 
lab.  The  central  feature  of  the  auctions  that  we  want  to  test  is  the  sequence  of  events: 
simultaneity of allocation of transmission capacity and energy in the implicit auction versus 
the  sequential  allocation  of  transmission  capacity  and  energy  in  the  explicit  auction.  We 
provide  rationale  in  the  section  for  the  structures  of  energy  markets  and  identify  which 
features of the market are going to be tested. 
2.2.1.  The implicit auction  
The  implicit  auction  consists  in  simultaneously  allocating  transmission  and  energy 
capacities,  in  respectively  a  centralized  and  a  decentralized  way.  Figure  5  represents  the 
sequence of events and the information structure for the implicit auction.  
Participants may submit offers to either sell or buy units of electricity. Each offer is 
made  for  a  dedicated  node,  and  is  composed  of  a  unit  price/quantity  pair.  We  use  an 
optimization algorithm to determine the set of offers that maximizes the total surplus, and that 
is compatible with two constraints: (i) the aggregate supply must equal the aggregate demand 
of the whole system, and (ii) the transmission constraints (capacities, flows and loop-flows) 
have to be respected
10. 
                                                 
9 These values are used as a reference to assess the efficiency of the allocation obtained during the 
experiment. If the computed global surplus equals these values, this corresponds to an efficiency rate of 100%. 
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Fig. 5 - Sequence of events in the implicit auction 
 
If no congestion occurs, then the selection process simply follows the merit order: offers 
are selected according to the increasing order of unit prices to equalize the market supply and 
demand. In this case, the energy prices at the three nodes are equal. If congestion occurs, then 
the merit order is corrected according to the network constraint and the localization of offers. 
In  practice,  this  implies  that  some  offers  that  would  have  been  retained  without  any 
congestion are finally not accepted; while others that were too high to be retained at first 
glance will finally be accepted. Energy prices at each node are obtained using the shadow 
prices  computed  from  the  Lagrangian  maximization  program.  The  bidding  constraints 
associated with the congested transmission line give the price of the congestion. The marginal 
price of electricity at each node is then inferred from this price through the PTDF-matrix
11. 
Each generator receives private information concerning the acceptance rate of each of 
its offers, along with public information about the price at each node and the flows on each 
line. The profits of a generator for a period equal the sum of the profits it is making at each 
node. At a given node, its profits correspond to the sum of the redemption values of the units 
it owns and the revenue from the units it has sold. 
2.2.2.  The coordinated explicit auction 
One  of  the  main  features  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  is  that  it  affords  any 
generator in a given power network the opportunity to buy and sell energy at each node of the 
                                                 
11 The calculation of the energy prices from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian of the 
maximization program is detailed in Appendix 1. 
Generators submit at each zone: 
 offers to sell and buy energy 
Multi-zone merit order under 
network constraints:  
Uniform-price sealed-bid auction 
Generators obtain market information:  
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network, even if it is (or not) physically producing energy at that node. Since the auction for 
transmission capacity and energy are clearly separated, the only condition for a generator who 
wishes  to  sell  at  a  node  where  it  is  not  present,  is  to  have  bought  the  corresponding 
transmission capacity to transport energy to this node prior to the energy auction. Figure 6 




Fig. 6 - Sequence of events in the coordinated explicit auction 
 
The coordinated explicit auction is a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, a uniform-
price auction is organized for the allocation of the sole transmission capacity between nodes 
in the network. In the second stage, an energy market opens at each node. These energy 
markets at each node work independently of one another, using a uniform-price mechanism to 
equilibrate the corresponding nodal market supply and demand. In other words, this second 
stage  works  as  a  procurement  auction,  run  to  allocate  the  right  to  inject  energy  into  or 
withdraw it from the network.  
A  crucial  characteristic  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  considered  in  the  ETSO 
proposal is the “must use” attribute of the capacity allocated to a generator. In the capacity 
allocation stage, generators bid for “obligations” rather than “options” to use transmission 






Multi-line maximization of the profits from the 
auction under transmission constraints:  
Line by line uniform-price sealed-bid auction 
Generators get market information:  
Transmission obligations, line 




Independent Merit order for offers in each 
zone:  
Three uniform-price sealed-bid auctions 
Generators submit offers 
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since they enable an operator to net the electricity flows running in opposite directions
12. In 
practice, in the experiment, through individual demand and supply functions, generators are 
individually  penalized  if  the  flows  that  they  have  generated  do  not  correspond  to  the 
transmission  capacity  that  they  acquired  in  the  first  stage,  i.e.  if  they  use  more  or  fewer 
capacity  than  they  previously  bought
13.    A  generator  which  fails  to  use  the  transmission 
capacity allocated to it for the period is penalized through high production costs at the node 
where it should have had injected energy, and a zero redemption value at the node where it 
should  have  withdrawn  energy.  This  acts  as  a  penalty  high  enough  to  discourage  such a 
behaviour. 
Stage I: Auction for transmission capacity 
The  first  stage  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  is  the  allocation  of  the  existing 
transmission capacity.  The participants bid to buy only transmission capacity that are sold by 
a factitious central auction house on the basis of the information given by the transmission 
system operators. At this stage, each participant is allowed to submit bids to buy a right to use 
transmission capacity from one node to another node for one period. The proposal is thus 
defined by the injection node, the withdrawal node, the amount of energy units transmitted, 
and  the  per-transmission-capacity  unit  price.  The  bidders  identify  the  line  as  well  as  the 
direction of the flow.  
The auction for transmission capacity ends before the starting of the auction for energy. 
Consequently,  the  bids  for  transmission  capacity  depend  on  the  market  participants’ 
anticipations of energy market prices. 
To allocate transmission capacity, a uniform-price sealed-bid auction is used. Given the 
received  bids,  and  taking  into  account  the  network  constraints,  the  central  auctioneer 
determines which bids will be accepted and the price paid for them. The selection of the bids 
and the determination of the equilibrium price result from the maximization of the profits 
from  the  auction  under  the  transmission  constraints.  The  transmission capacity  should  be 
                                                 
12  The  netting  of  the  flows  is  automatically  taken  into  account  in  the  implicit  auction  through  the 
optimization program and the PTDF. Since in the explicit auctions the market participants bid for transmission 
capacities for one zone to another, we have to assume that they bid for obligations so that they can use the same 
amount of capacity as with the implicit auction. Otherwise the implicit auction would de facto be more efficient 
than the explicit one. 
13 For example, a generator who has bought capacities to transport units from zone A to zone C has to 
inject – to produce or to buy – the adequate quantity in zone A at any cost, and to withdraw – to sell or use – the 
same amount in zone C even if it yields zero revenue. At the extreme, to respect transmission commitment, the 
generator who failed to buy the adequate quantity at the exportation zone could suffer important production costs 
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allocated to those who value them the most, under the constraint that the amount allocated at 
the end of the process should not exceed the maximum capacity of each line (taking into 
account both the flows and counter flows). Given that the transmission rights are directional, 
each  line  is  characterized  by  a  double  capacity  limit  constraint.  We  use  an  optimization 
algorithm to determine the set of bids that are finally accepted
14. If there is no congestion, all 
bids are accepted. If one or more congestions occur, some bids have to be partly accepted and 
even rejected.  
At  the  end  of  the  auction  process,  each  generator  receives  private  information 
concerning the acceptance rate of each of its bids, and public information on the price and the 
flows of each directional transmission line, and on the congestions. Prices for transmission 
rights are obtained using the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization 
program. The bidding constraints associated with the congested transmission lines give the 
price of the congestion. The marginal price of transmission rights for each line is calculated 
by multiplying the shadow prices by the PTDF factor
15. In general, to accept or reject part of a 
bid, the software calculates the price at which each generator agrees to pay for using the 
congested line. It then gives priority to those bids that value the congested line most. It orders 
bids  by  increasing  prices,  which  have  been  normalized  by  the  Power  Transmission 
Distribution  Factors  (PTDF)  of  the  concerned  injection  node  and  for  the  requested 
transmission line. The software accepts bids until all the transmission capacities are exhausted 
(after  checking  that  it  does  not  create  any  additional  congestion).  The  price  that  each 
generator has to pay equals the last bid accepted by the auctioneer, weighted by the PTDF of 
each of its bids on the constrained line. At the end, a generator pays a price for transmission 
that corresponds to its contribution to the congestion, related to the flow that it wants. If the 
flow contributes to relieving the congestion, the price the generator has to pay is negative i.e. 
it is paid for its transmission. If the allocation implies no congestion, no generator is charged 
for the capacity allocated. 
Stage II: Auction for energy 
The second stage consists of three independent and simultaneous energy markets, one 
for each node. Generators are allowed to participate in the three auctions simultaneously. 
However, they expose themselves to considerable costs if they do not own the corresponding 
                                                 
14 The bidding process and the optimization program are set out in Appendix 2. 
15 The calculation of prices for transmission right from the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian 
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transmission capacity for the unit that they are selling in any market where they are not 
present. This design features aims at capturing the “must-use” rule. 
The three energy auctions are uniform-price sealed-bid auctions, where the offers (either 
to sell or to buy) are composed of a price/quantity of energy pair. The allocation of energy 
through each auction results from the maximization of the total surplus. It therefore follows a 
simple merit order (the offers are selected according to the increasing order of prices to meet 
the must-serve demand of the node considered). 
At the end of the three energy auctions, generators receive the information concerning 
the acceptation rate of each of their offers, and public information is given on the market 
prices at each node.  
The profits of a generator for a period are composed of three elements: (i) the sum of 
the gains
16 and losses from the use of transmission capacity, (ii) plus the sum of the profits 
and losses from market exchanges on the three energy marketplaces, (iii) plus the sum of the 
redemption values of the units consumed minus the marginal cost of the units produced at 
each  node,  subject  to  the  final  individual  injections  and  withdrawals  resulting  from  the 
transmission commitments and the energy market transactions. 
3.  RESULTS 
The experiments were run in the experimental laboratories of the GATE (Lyon) and of 
the GAEL (Grenoble), using a dedicated market software developed with the experimental 
software  Regate,  the  Internet-Based  Software  for  Experimental  Economics  of  the  GATE 
(Zeiliger  2000).  Undergraduate  students  were  recruited  from  a  business  school,  an 
engineering school and economic departments of the universities of the two locations.  
Given  the  relative  complexity  of  the  experimental  design,  we  organized  each 
experimental session over two days, lasting two and a half hours on each day. The first day, 
students  were  taught  the  rules  and  trained  with  the  instructions.  The  second  day,  they 
participated in the experimental session itself, taking the results into account for the payment. 
The data and results reported below were collected from these second-day sessions.  
                                                 









































1  16 
In the lab, the duration of one period of an implicit session is shorter than one period of 
an explicit session
17. This explains why the number of periods per session collected for the 
explicit treatment in our early experiments was lower than for the implicit treatment. In order 
to control for this difference, we conducted four additional explicit treatment sessions with 
extended sessions lasting at least 20 periods. Finally, we ran sixteen sessions in total, using 
the two market mechanisms as treatment variables. We have six independent findings for the 
implicit mechanism and ten for the explicit mechanism (see Table 3). Subjects were paid a 
 20 fixed payment for the “learning session” and, on average,  26 for the "data session". 
 
Table 3 - Summary of experiments 
Session  Date  Treatment  Number of periods 
Implicit-S1  25&26 May 2005  Implicit  26 
Implicit-S2  25&26 May 2005  Implicit  26 
Implicit-S3  25&26 May 2005  Implicit  24 
Implicit-S4  8&9 June 2005  Implicit  30 
Implicit-S5  8&9 June 2005  Implicit  30 
Implicit-S6  8&9 June 2005  Implicit  30 
Explicit-S1  6&7 June 2005  Explicit  14 
Explicit-S2  6&7 June 2005  Explicit  15 
Explicit-S3  6&7 June 2005  Explicit  14 
Explicit-S4  15&16 June 2005  Explicit  15 
Explicit-S5  15&16 June 2005  Explicit  17 
Explicit-S6  15&16 June 2005  Explicit  17 
Explicit-S7  12 November 2009  Explicit  19 
Explicit-S8  12 November 2009  Explicit  24 
Explicit-S9  12 November 2009  Explicit  25 
Explicit-S10  12 November 2009  Explicit  26 
 
 
We report our results as a series of five findings, one related to the global efficiency of 
the  system  (i.e.  the  evaluation  of  the  global  surplus)  and  four  concerning  the  economic 
performance of each auction design in terms of energy prices and flows.  
3.1.  Global efficiency  
The efficiency is equal to the ratio of the observed global surplus and the theoretical 
maximum  global  surplus.  For  the  implicit  treatment,  we  calculated  the  global  surplus  by 
summing the four generators’ profits plus the congestion rents in the implicit treatment. In the 
explicit treatment, the global surplus is the sum of the four generators’ profits plus revenues 
                                                 
17 A period of coordinated explicit auction with a sequence of two interdependent auctions takes more 
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obtained from the sale of transmission rights. We observe extensive individual losses during 
some periods conducted under the explicit treatment. In order not to sidestep the analysis in 
favour  of  the  implicit  treatment,  we  decided  to  reduce  negative  efficiency  rates  to  zero. 
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the average global efficiency, and the minimum and maximum 
levels observed by treatment.  
We present the results in two graphs: the first one is based on the sessions lasting 14 
periods, while the second one is based on the sessions lasting at least 24 periods
18.   
 
 
Fig. 7 - Average global efficiency (14 periods) 
 
 
Fig. 8 - Average global efficiency (sessions over 24 periods only) 
 
                                                 
18  Although  all  sessions  lasted  for  at  least  14  periods,  only  9  lasted  for  24  periods.  These  longer  sessions 
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The implicit auction appears as the most efficient mechanism (Fig. 7). For the sessions 
conducted under the implicit treatment, efficiency increases rapidly and remains close to the 
90% level. Overall, we observe only 5 periods, out of the 166 periods collected, which have a 
zero or negative efficiency rate whereas for 38 periods the efficiency rate is over 95%. In the 
sessions  of  the  explicit  treatment,  the  observed  efficiency  rate  is  significantly  lower  and 
erratic (especially for the session lasting over 24 periods). Negative global surplus and zero 
efficiency are even observed in 25 of the 187 periods collected. The mean efficiency rate for 
the coordinated explicit auction treatment over all the periods is 50% whereas the figure 
obtained for the implicit auction treatment is 81%. 
 
Finding 1: The implicit auction is more efficient than the coordinated explicit auction.  
Evidence: In all sessions and all periods taken together, the mean global efficiency for 
the implicit treatment is 81% against 50% for the explicit treatment.   
•  In the implicit auction treatment, the global surplus increases with the number 
of  periods,  which  suggests  that  generators  are  learning  how  to  be  more 
efficient. Furthermore, the efficiency is higher for peak periods. 
•  In  the  coordinated  explicit  treatment  the  evolution  of  the  efficiency  rate  is 
erratic and it is not possible to conclude on any learning effect, even when 
taking into account the session with up to 24 periods.  
We use the following linear panel data model as the basis for a quantitative support to 
Finding 1. The model explains the efficiency of a session as a function notably of the level of 
demand  and  the  dynamic  convergence  toward  100%  efficiency.  The  sixteen  independent 
sessions are modelled as random effects  .  
  
Effit =  0 +  1Dit
DH +  2Dit
Exp +  3t
2 + it 
where 
  
Effit  denotes the efficiency of session i at period t, 
  
Dit
DH a dummy variable 








2, the square of period, fits the dynamics of the convergence to 100% 
efficiency observed in the data
19.  
 
                                                 
19 By definition, the efficiency indicator is limited at the 100% level. Nevertheless, we observe no specific 
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Table 4 - Estimates of the linear model for efficiency (using between-effect specification) 
 
Table 4 reports the estimateS of the linear model for efficiency. The coordinated explicit 
treatment  significantly  contributes  to  reducing  the  efficiency.  The  loss  of  efficiency  is 
estimated at 32%. The efficiency observed in peak-load periods is significantly greater than 
that observed in base-load periods (10.6%). Efficiency increases significantly as the periods 
are  repeated.  This  could  be  interpreted  as  a  learning  dynamic.  Learning  is  nevertheless 
minimal compared to the efficiency gap between coordinated explicit and implicit auction. 
Even in this experimental environment favourable to learning (at least 24 periods), it could 
take very long before explicit auctions become as efficient as implicit auctions. Note that the 
experimental environment is particularly favourable for learning as all variables are stable 
from  one  period  to  another.  We  can  anticipate  that  observations  under  a  more  unstable 
environment would reinforce our conclusion about the superiority of the implicit treatment for 
efficiency.    
These differences in efficiency between the two treatments can be explained by the joint 
effect of two factors: the evolution and convergence of energy prices (3.2) and the flows 
between nodes (3.3). We will now analyze these two effects separately. 
3.2.  Energy prices  
The market prices observed at each node are compared to the competitive equilibrium 
(CE) price computed when assuming that each generator offers energy at a price equal to its 
marginal value with the implicit treatment. Average distance from CE prices and standard 
deviations by period and by treatment are represented in Figures 9, 10 for node A, 11 and 12 
for node B and 13 and 14 for node C, for the 14 firsts periods with all the sessions.  
 
  
Effit =  0 +  1Dit
DH +  2Dit
Exp +  3tit
2 + it 
  Coef  Std. Err.  z  P > | z | 
  0. 6632  0. 0485  13.67  0.001 
  0.1066  0. 0317  3.37  0.000 
  -0.32  0. 0582  -5.49  0.000 
  0.0003  0. 0001  5.55  0.000 
353 Obs 
Rsquare overall = 0.3401 
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Fig. 9 – Node A for implicit treatment 
   
Fig. 10 – Node A for explicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 11 – Node B for implicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 12 – Node B for explicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 13 – Node C for implicit treatment 
 
 
Fig. 14 – Node C for explicit treatment 
Fig. 13-14 – Average distance from competitive equilibrium price and standard deviation (in ECU). 
 
The differences between treatments are unambiguous. The dispersion of energy prices 
and the volatility of prices from period to period rapidly decrease in the implicit auction 
sessions: there is a strong convergence toward a single, specific price at each node. We find 
higher price dispersion between sessions with the coordinated explicit auction and higher 
volatility from period to period in each session.  
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Finding  2:  Energy  prices  observed  in  the  implicit  auction  sessions  converge 
towards a single equilibrium price. 
To  assess  quantitatively  the  evolution  and  convergence  of  market  prices,  we  use  a 
convergence model inspired by Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995) for data collected with 





   1i 1/t ( )+  2(t  1)/t + it 
where   is the average price of session i for period t and   a dummy variable which 
takes the value one for session i and zero otherwise. This model is relevant to estimate the 
convergence process which could occur in a market experiment. Even if each session has its 
own starting point, they should converge – if a convergence occurs – to the same ultimate 
point. The model is estimated as a linear panel data model and the six independent sessions 
are  modelled  as  random  effects  .  We  estimate  the  model  for  the  price  of  each  node, 
distinguishing  between  base-load  and  peak-load  periods.  As  the  prices  observed  at  the 
beginning of each session are not really relevant to our analysis, we focus our presentation on 
price convergence
21. Table 5 reports the estimates for   for each node and for base-load and 
peak-load periods.  




  Coef  Std. Err.  z  P > | z |  [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 50)  59.724  2.0022  29.83  0.000  55.800  63.648 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 93)  90.136  0.7083  127.25  0.000  88.747  91.524 
 
Node B 
  Coef  Std. Err.  z  P > | z |  [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 79)  80.375  0.7871  102.11  0.000  78.833  81.918 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 109)  107.382  0.5358  200.4  0.000  106.332  108.432 
 
Node C 
  Coef  Std. Err.  z  P > | z |  [95% Conf. Inteval] 
Load  period (Comp. Price: 108)  102.173  1.1296  90.45  0.000  99.959  104.387 
Peak-load period (Comp. Price: 125)  125.861  1.5485  81.28  0.000  122.826  128.896 
 
                                                 
20 The price dynamics for the coordinated explicit auction treatments do not fit the assumption of this 
model. As a result, we cannot conduct the same analysis for the data collected in this treatment. 
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Energy  prices  observed  with  the  implicit  treatment  converge  towards  a  single 
equilibrium  price  for  each  node  and  for  each  demand  level.  The  estimated  prices  of 
convergence are statistically significant and have a small standard deviation. The price of 
convergence for node A and base-load periods equals 59.7 and is significantly higher than the 
competitive market price of 50. Likewise, the price of convergence for node C and base-load 
periods  equals  102.1,  that  is,  less  than  the  competitive  market  price  of  108.  These 
observations suggest the use of market power from generator G1 at node A and generator G4 
at  node  C.  Apart  from  these  two  situations,  the  observed  market  prices  converge  to  the 
competitive market price.  
 
  Finding  3:  Energy  prices  in  the  coordinated  explicit  auction  sessions  fail  to 
converge to a single equilibrium price.  
The coordinated explicit auction does not induce price stability in the system. Figures 
10,  12  and  14  show  price  dispersions  between  sessions.  These  price  dispersions  are 
significant. For instance, for the 14
th period, we observe a standard deviation of 90 ECU at 
node A, 126 ECU at node B and 28 ECU at node C. These dispersions between sessions do 
not disappear with period repetitions. The volatility of energy prices has a direct consequence 
on the efficiency of the auction for transmission capacity. An accurate valuation of these 
capacities requires stable energy prices at each node of the network. Without this stability 
generators cannot correctly assess the inter-node market price differences, and therefore can 
hardly bid appropriately during the transmission auction. As a consequence, the energy price 
instability leads to a misallocation of transmission capacity.  
3.3.  Flows, congestions and transmission prices 
Given the market structure at each node and maximum capacities for each line, line AC 
appears as the critical resource in the search for the optimal energy allocation through the 
three-node  network.  We  can  therefore  expect  permanent  congestion  on  this  line  with  an 
efficient allocation of transmission capacity. Rates of congestion reported in Tables 6 and 7 
show a significant difference in the allocation of transmission capacity between sessions with 
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Base-load period  Peak-load period 
Line  AB  AC  BC  AB  AC  BC 
Obs.  83  83  83  83  83  83 
Mean flow  22  30  8  11  29  19 
Congestion 
observed  17  81  24  0  81  30 
Table 6 - Congestion with implicit treatment 
Rate of 
congestion  21%  98%  29%  0%  98%  36% 
 
 
Base-load period  Peak-load period 
Line  AB  AC  BC  AB  AC  BC 
Obs.  98  98  98  89  89  89 
Mean flow  11  27  17  4  29  25 
Congestion 
observed 
5  74  43  1  84  50 
Table 7 - Congestion with explicit treatment 
Rate of 
congestion 
5%  76%  44%  1%  94%  56% 
 
Finding 4. The implicit auction leads to a better allocation of transmission capacity in 
the network, compared to the coordinated explicit auction, which leads to an under-use 
of the transmission capacity. 
We  observe  that  transmission  lines  are  saturated  with  both  mechanisms  especially 
during  peak-load  periods  when  the  demand  on  the  network  is  greater.  During  base-load 
periods, for the critical line AC, congestion is observed in almost every period in the implicit 
treatment. In the explicit treatment, congestion rate of line AC is above 75%. The capacity of 
line AC is thus not fully allocated for one period out of four. These results show that, under 
explicit treatment, there is an under-use of the network, with inadequate flows and at least 
efficiency waste. 
 
Finding  5.  Transmission  prices  exhibit  high  dispersion  throughout  the  repetition  of 
periods in the coordinated explicit auction sessions  
The price dispersion between and within sessions is such that a structured analysis of 
the price convergence cannot be used. We thus restrict our study to a descriptive analysis. 
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Table 8 - Price of transmission capacity in the coordinated explicit session  
Base-load period (98 obs.)  A B  A C  B C 
Competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacity
22  29  58  29 
Mean price  7.57  19.33  11.73 
Standard deviation  10.10  15.29  8.88 
Maximum price  26  52  60 
Minimum price  -30  0  0 
       









Competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacity  16  32  16 
Mean price  7.62  18.80  11.19 
Standard deviation  7.03  11.76  6.70 
Maximum price  21  42  35 
Minimum price  -18  0  0 
   
We  find  that  prices  are  lower  than  competitive  equilibrium  prices  for  transmission 
capacity at each node and for both base-load and peak-load periods. This result is a direct 
consequence  of  an  under-use  of  the  transmission  capacity,  for  the  price  of  transmission 
capacity is reduced to zero in periods without congestion. The standard deviations as the 
maximum  and  minimum  values  indicate  that  the  prices  are  spread  over  a  wide  range  of 
values.  These  prices  are  highly  volatile  and  this  volatility  does  not  decrease  with  period 
repetition.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
Using the experimental methodology in the laboratory setting, we tested and compared 
the efficiency of two alternative cross-border congestion management methods for electricity 
networks. Compared to the implicit mechanism, the coordinated explicit auction reveals its 
relative inefficiency in the laboratory, with mispricing and misallocation through the sequence 
of auctions. This is due to the necessary “must use it” rule: once bought, the transmission 
capacities have to be used otherwise there is a high penalty. Given this rule, a generator could 
have the incentive to sell energy at a very low price or to buy energy at a very high price to be 
able to meet its commitment. Price volatility on energy markets is an immediate consequence 
of the "must use rule" that makes it difficult for generators to accurately assess the inter-node 
market price differences, and therefore to bid efficiently during the transmission auction. It 
                                                 
22 The competitive equilibrium price for transmission capacities is computed under the assumption that 
allocation of transmission capacities is efficient and that prices on the energy market at each node are equivalent 








































1  25 
can consequently destabilize cross-border flows compared to the optimum flows and in return, 
destabilize the energy markets. 
Our  results  provide  evidence  that  the  implicit  auction  is  more  efficient  than  the 
coordinated explicit auction for the allocation of both transmission capacity and energy. They 
contribute to the current discussions on cross-border congestion methods. They show that 
even in a simple environment such as the one we created in the laboratory, subjects are not 
able  to  correctly  anticipate  what  will  happen  in  the  energy  markets  with  the  coordinated 
explicit auction, and therefore do not individually take the right decisions in the capacity 
market.  
One explanation for this difference is the level of individual expectations that a subject 
needs  in  the  experiment.  In  the  coordinated  explicit  auction,  individuals  have  to  form 
expectations  about  both  the  transmission  prices  and  the  three  energy  market  prices.  The 
transmission prices depend on individual expectations about future energy prices, and in a 
repeated environment the energy prices in turn affect expectations about future individual 
decisions on transmission capacity. Overall, in the laboratory setting, the experiment reveals 
that even in longer sessions, individuals are constantly learning throughout the repetition of 
periods, collectively experiencing a “trial and error process” regarding their expectations of 
others’ behaviors. The laboratory experiments suggest that the learning process is long and 
demanding at the individual level. Complementary results using simulation models on a much 
longer timeline should help to shed light on the timing of the learning process. Our findings 
furthermore suggest the need to design and add rules to accelerate the learning process and 
thereby  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  coordinated  explicit  auction.  We  suggest  that  the 
addition of a secondary market on transmission capacity would operate as a way to price and 
value individual and collective over-investment or under-investment in transmission capacity. 
Another  suggestion  would  be  to  add  the  possibilities  to  sell  or  to  buy  back  transmission 
capacity to/from the system operator, adding a price corridor for transmission capacity to buy 
or to sell in order to give generators the financial incentives to do so.  
 
The introduction of the coordinated explicit auction however still raises many practical 
and  institutional  issues  in  Europe.  Together  with  efficiency  issues,  they  seem  to  have 
condemned the coordinated explicit auction for the IEM. Recent propositions are oriented 
more towards the implementation of a hybrid implicit/explicit auction (Frontier Economics 
Limited  Consentec,  2004)  or  towards  the  use  of  the  implicit  auction  in  its  open-market 
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  Finally,  the  economic  systems-design  experiments  presented  in  this  paper  raise a  
general methodological question. As we use the lab to test-bed market mechanisms, trying to 
integrate a certain level of parallelism with reality (meaning a level of complexity in the 
electric power case) in order to inform the liberalization process, we rely on experienced 
students  to  learn  and  perform  individual  decisions.  Markets  are  used  as  an  “impersonal 
exchange” system (Smith, 2003) to render these decisions as fundamental as we need them to 
be. The limitations of the experiments lie in two opposite directions: reducing the level of 
complexity  would  render  the  experiments  simpler  but  lower  the  informative  value  of  the 
results, given the specificity of the mechanism studied. On the other hand, increasing the level 
of  complexity  seems  inappropriate  in  the  laboratory  setting,  and  rather  calls  for 
complementary  methods,  like  agent-based  modelling  that  would  improve  generalised 
laboratory results.  
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 APPENDIX  1:  BIDDING  PROCESS  AND  OPTIMIZATION  ALGORITHM  WITH 
IMPLICIT AUCTIONS 
For each period, each generator has the opportunity to submit a set of offers to sell and 
bids to buy. An offer to sell is a price-quantity ordered pair such that 
  
piX
S ,SiX ( ) is an offer to 
sell of one generator at node X, where 
  
piX
S  is the unit price at which the generator agrees to 
sell and 
  
SiX  the quantity he proposes to sell. Symmetrically, 
  
p jX
D ,DjX ( ) is an offer to buy of 
one generator at node X where 
  
p jX
D  is the unit price at which the generator agrees to buy and 
  
DjX  the  quantity  he  proposes  to  buy.  For  all  offers,  the  submitted  quantities  have  to  be 
positive (
  
DjX > 0and 
  
SiX > 0) as do the submitted prices 
  
piX
S > 0 and 
  
p jX
D > 0.  




d jX, respectively the allocated quantity 
corresponding to the submitted offers to sell 
  
piX
S ,SiX ( ) and bids to buy 
  
p jX
D ,DjX ( ), and 
  
ˆ  p  X the 
market  price  for  energy  at  node  X  (energy  prices  are  shadow  prices  computed  from  the 
Lagrangian of the maximization program). 
Allocations and prices are determined according to the following optimization process. 
Constraint  (1)  indicates  that  offers  can  be  either  accepted  or  refused,  partly  or  entirely. 
Constraint (2) indicates that the total supply has to equal the total demand. Constraints (3) 
correspond to transmission constraints on each line, in both senses of the flows. Therefore 
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Prices are the shadow prices computed from the Lagrangian maximization program:  
  
L(s,d,µ) = p jX
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with s, the set of allocated quantity to sell 
d, the set of allocated quantity to buy 
  
µ, the set of Lagrange multipliers 
  
FXY, the flow on line (X,Y) 
  








































1  30 
, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the system equilibrium constraint and 
  
µXY, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the transmission constraints on line (X,Y).  
 
Once  the  Lagrangian  is  optimized,  we  can  compute  the  value  of    and
  
µXY.  The 
multiplier   corresponds to the marginal price for electricity (it corresponds to the marginal 
price of electricity at the swing node or at any bus if there are no network constraints). The 
Lagrangian  multiplier 
  
µXY  represents  the  marginal  price  associated  with  the  transmission 
constraints on line (X,Y). It is thus the price to transmit one additional unit of electricity from 
node X to node Y, or alternatively, the price of the congestion. 
 
Then, the marginal price of electricity at each node can be inferred from   and 
  
µXY by 
using the PTDF-matrix. 
With C taken as the swing node in our experiment, it results in:  
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APPENDIX  2:  BIDDING  PROCESS  AND  OPTIMIZATION  ALGORITHM  FOR  THE 
TRANSMISSION  AUCTION  OF  THE  COORDINATED  EXPLICIT  AUCTION 
MECHANISM 
For  each  period,  each  generator  has  the  opportunity  to  submit  a  set  of  bids  to  buy 
transmission rights on the three lines of the network. A bid to buy a transmission right is a 
price-quantity  ordered  pair  such  that    is  a  bid  to  buy  of  one  generator  for  a 
transmission right from node X to node Y,   the per unit maximum price that generator 
agrees to pay, and   the transmission capacity from node X to node Y that he requests. We 
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The outcome of the allocation process is  , the transmission capacity units allocated 
to the bid to buy  , and   the price for the transmission capacity rights. The 



















   
with t, the set of allocated transmission capacities 
  
µ, the set of Lagrange multipliers 
  
FXY, the flow on line (X,Y) 
  
FXY , the maximum capacity of line (X,Y) 
  
µXY, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the transmission constraints for line XY.  
 
Once the Lagrangian is optimized, we can compute the value of 
  
µXY. The Lagrangian 
multiplier 
  
µXY represents the marginal price associated with the transmission constraints on 
the line (X,Y). It is thus the price to transmit one additional unit of electricity from node X to 
node Y, or alternatively, the price of the congestion. Then, the marginal price of electricity at 
each line can be inferred from 
  
µXY by using the PTDF-matrix. 
  
ˆ  p  AB = µAB  1/3.µBC +1/3.µAC 
  
ˆ  p  AC = µAC  1/3.µAB +1/3.µBC 
  
ˆ  p  BC = µBC  1/3.µAC +1/3.µAC 
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APPENDIX 3: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS AT EACH NODE 
Individual demand and supply at node A 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  Cm    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  150  50    0  400  49 
151  200  70    401  500  0 
201  350  150         
351  450  200         
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  Cm    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  30  70    0  20  69 
31  180  150    21  570  49 




Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  Cm    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  40  90    0  10  89 
41  140  200    11  60  64 
        61  160  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  Cm    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  20  90    0  30  89 
21  120  200    31  80  69 
        81  180  0 
 
Generator 3 and Generator 4 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  200    0  100  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
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Individual demand and supply at node B 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)°    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  30  80    0  70  79 
31  80  130    71  170  0 
81  180  200         
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  30  110    0  40  109 
31  130  200    41  140  79 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  80  75    0  20  74 
81  130  110    21  120  49 
131  230  200    121  220  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  110    0  60  109 
101  200  200    61  160  49 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  130  85    0  120  84 
131  280  110    121  270  49 
281  380  200    271  370  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  60  105    0  100  104 
61  160  200    101  350  79 
        351  500  49 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  200    0  100  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
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Individual demand and supply at node C 
Generator 1 
Base-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  10  110    0  20  109 
11  110  200    21  120  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  200    0  50  130 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  200    0  100  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  10  110    0  50  109 
11  110  200    51  80  69 
           81  180  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  100  200    0  30  130 
        31  60  110 




Marginal cost (MC)    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  60  100    0  100  99 
61  160  200    101  270  69 
        271  370  0 
Peak-load period 
Marginal cost (MC°    Redemption value 
From unit…  To unit …  MC    From unit…  To unit …  RV 
0  90  125    0  30  125 
91  190  200    31  130  110 
        131  300  70 
        301  400  0 
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